Research Article

E-Government and Public Service Delivery: An Analysis of the "Lapor!" Citizen Complaint System's Effectiveness and Challenges

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Abstract

E-Government platforms like Indonesia's *"Lapor!"* citizen complaint system (CCS) aim to enhance public accountability. However, a persistent gap exists between this technological promise and the bureaucratic challenges of ensuring tangible resolution, leading to digital disillusionment. This study evaluates the effectiveness of *"Lapor!"* and identifies institutional challenges. It analyzes quantitative performance indicators and triangulates them with the qualitative experiences of citizens and government administrators. A sequential explanatory mixed-methods design was used, involving quantitative analysis of 50,000 system records (2023-2024) and 80 semi-structured interviews with citizens and administrators. Findings reveal a low resolution rate (38.7%) and significant delays (Mean response: 14.2 days), statistically linked to inter-agency *"ping-ponging."* Qualitative data identified citizen *"Digital Disillusionment"* and administrator *"Institutional Ambiguity"* as key explanatory themes. *"Lapor!"* succeeds as a digital intake system but fails as an accountability mechanism. The ineffectiveness stems not from technology but from unresolved institutional challenges, primarily the lack of an empowered arbiter for inter-agency disputes.

Keywords: Bureaucratic Reform, Citizen Complaint System, E-Government

INTRODUCTION

The global paradigm of governance has been fundamentally reshaped by the proliferation of digital technology, catalyzing a widespread shift towards electronic government (*E-Government*). This transformation is predicated on the strategic use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) to streamline administrative processes, enhance transparency, and foster more responsive, accessible, and accountable public administration (Abdi, 2025). Governments worldwide are investing heavily in digital infrastructure, viewing it as a critical vector for modernizing state functions, reducing bureaucratic friction, and reconfiguring the fundamental relationship between the citizen and the state (Abdo, 2023). This digital transition promises to move beyond simple information provision, aiming to create interactive, participatory platforms for service delivery and civic engagement.

Public service delivery remains a cornerstone of state legitimacy and a primary interface through which citizens evaluate government performance (Abidin & Husin, 2025). Historically, particularly within developing nations and decentralized archipelagos, this delivery has been fraught with challenges, including inefficiency, a lack of transparency, complex bureaucratic hierarchies, and significant regional disparities in access and quality (Abdulai, 2024). Citizens have often faced a disempowering, opaque system where mechanisms for recourse or feedback are minimal, inaccessible, or ineffective, leading to widespread public dissatisfaction and a deficit of trust in public institutions.

Citizen Complaint Systems (CCS), re-imagined as digital platforms, have emerged as a potent tool within the *E-Government* arsenal to address these deep-seated issues (Adam, 2025). These systems are designed to function as formal channels for citizens to report grievances, service failures, and misconduct, thereby providing governments with real-time, ground-level data for monitoring performance and implementing targeted reforms. In this context, Indonesia's *"Lapor!"* (Layanan Aspirasi dan Pengaduan Online Rakyat) represents one of the most ambitious national-scale implementations (Abu Azam & Rabei, 2025). This integrated, multi-platform system, managed by the Executive Office of the President (KSP), aims to connect citizens directly to over 700 government ministries, agencies, and regional governments, positioning itself as the central nexus for public aspiration and grievance management in the country.

The ambitious implementation and high-level political backing of the *"Lapor!"* system present a significant potential for transformative change in Indonesian public service. A critical disconnect, however, often exists between the sophisticated technological deployment of such *E-Government* platforms and their actual integration into entrenched bureaucratic cultures (Afanador-Llach, 2023). The mere existence of a digital portal for complaints does not automatically guarantee responsive governance, bureaucratic accountability, or satisfactory resolution for the citizenry (Afshar Hosseinabadi et al., 2025). A system, no matter how well-designed, is only as effective as the institutional willingness and capacity to act upon the data it generates.

A significant problem, widely anecdotally reported by users and civil society observers, is the persistent gap between the submission of a complaint and its tangible resolution (Aksakallı, 2025). Citizens frequently cite issues such as excessively slow response times that exceed stated service-level agreements, the *"ping-ponging"* of reports between different government agencies without clear responsibility, and formulaic, non-substantive replies that close tickets without addressing the underlying issue (Aizawa, 2023). This creates a substantial risk of *"digital disillusionment,"* where citizens perceive the platform as a mere *"digital safety valve"* for venting frustration rather than a genuine instrument of change, thereby undermining its core purpose and public trust.

The specific, unaddressed research problem is the absence of a comprehensive, multi-stakeholder empirical analysis of *"Lapor!'s"* effectiveness and the institutional challenges that impede it (Al-Moteri et al., 2025). While many studies have focused on user adoption or

technical descriptions, there is a lack of rigorous research that triangulates system performance data with the qualitative experiences of both the users (citizens) and the responders (government agency administrators) (Al-Oun & Al-Khasawneh, 2025). It remains empirically unclear to what extent *"Lapor!"* functions as an effective tool for accountability and service improvement versus a symbolic exercise in digital presence, and what specific organizational, political, and managerial barriers are the primary drivers of its shortcomings.

The primary objective of this research is to conduct a comprehensive, mixed-methods analysis of the *"Lapor!"* citizen complaint system to critically evaluate its effectiveness in enhancing *public service delivery* and to systematically identify the primary challenges hindering its optimal function (Alam et al., 2025). This study seeks to move beyond a simple audit of adoption rates, aiming instead to measure the system's tangible impact on bureaucratic responsiveness and problem resolution from a multi-stakeholder perspective (Alasiri et al., 2025).

This overarching goal is operationalized through three specific, interrelated sub-objectives. The first is to quantitatively assess the effectiveness of the *"Lapor!"* system by analyzing its key performance indicators (KPIs), including but not limited to, report resolution rates, agency response times, the frequency of report *"ping-ponging,"* and spatial-temporal trends in complaint types and resolution quality (Alden, 2023). The second objective is to qualitatively explore the lived experiences and perceptions of the system's key stakeholders, specifically (a) citizens who use the platform, (b) administrators within government agencies tasked with responding to complaints, and (c) system managers responsible for its national coordination (Alfitri et al., 2024).

A third and final objective is to identify and analyze the specific institutional and managerial challenges that impact the system's performance (Andrade et al., 2025). This involves investigating the organizational workflows for complaint handling within ministries, the adequacy of resources and training for agency responders, the efficacy of incentive and sanction mechanisms, and the political or cultural factors that may encourage or obstruct genuine bureaucratic responsiveness (Andina-Díaz et al., 2023). The ultimate aim is to synthesize these findings into a set of actionable, evidence-based recommendations for policy reform and systemic improvement.

The extant literature on *E-Government* is vast, yet it frequently suffers from a *"techno-optimistic"* bias, prioritizing studies on system design, technology adoption, and digital-divide metrics (Amiq et al., 2025). A significant conceptual gap exists in the body of research that moves beyond implementation to measure tangible outcomes. There is a scarcity of empirical work that rigorously connects the data generated by citizen feedback mechanisms directly to measurable changes in public service quality, bureaucratic behavior, or policy reform (Andersen, 2023). The literature often assumes this connection rather than proving it, leaving a critical gap in understanding *"what works."*

A second, more specific gap exists in the scholarly examination of the *"Lapor!"* system itself (Amancik et al., 2024). Existing research in the Indonesian context has largely consisted of small-scale, localized case studies, descriptive reports on the system's architecture, or qualitative surveys of user satisfaction in a single municipality or sector (Alves, 2025). There is a clear absence of comprehensive, national-scale research that triangulates quantitative performance data from the *"Lapor!"* dashboard with qualitative data from both citizens and the government officials who must use the system, thereby failing to capture the full, interactive *"complaint lifecycle."*

Methodologically, the field lacks in-depth, mixed-methods studies that analyze the institutional *"black box"* of complaint resolution (Alrefaei et al., 2025). Most research focuses either on the citizen *"front-end"* (e.g., usability, trust, willingness to report) or, less commonly, the government *"back-end"* (e.g., internal workflows, administrative capacity) in isolation. This study addresses this critical methodological gap by designing a framework that analyzes

the interaction between these two domains, tracing the journey of complaints from submission to final disposition to identify the precise human, technical, and institutional points of friction and failure (Alvariño & Thies, 2025).

The principal novelty of this research lies in its holistic, multi-stakeholder analytical framework (Alozie, 2025). It is among the first major studies to analyze a national-scale citizen complaint system by synthesizing large-scale quantitative performance data with in-depth qualitative insights from the three critical nodes of the network: the citizens (users), the agency administrators (responders), and the central system managers (coordinators). This 360-degree, empirically-grounded assessment provides a complete, nuanced picture of the *"Lapor!"* ecosystem, moving decisively beyond prior, more siloed analyses (Sianipar et al., 2025).

A second novel contribution is the study's conceptualization of *"Lapor!"* not merely as a technological artifact, but as a dynamic socio-political and organizational phenomenon. This research analyzes the platform as an arena of contestation, negotiation, and power dynamics between citizens and state actors (Pardosi et al., 2024). It offers a new model for assessing such systems as tools for *bureaucratic reform*, examining how they challenge (or fail to challenge) entrenched institutional cultures of opacity and unresponsiveness in a complex, decentralized democratic context (Santiago, 2024).

The justification for this research is its profound and immediate practical urgency for Indonesian governance and its significant theoretical value for the global field of *E-Government*. For Indonesia, *"Lapor!"* is a flagship initiative of its public service reform agenda; a rigorous, objective, and comprehensive analysis of its effectiveness and challenges is essential for evidence-based policymaking to ensure the system fulfills its promise. Theoretically, this study provides a much-needed, in-depth empirical case study from the Global South—the world's fourth-largest population—on the complex, on-the-ground realities of implementing digital governance, offering critical, generalizable lessons for other nations pursuing similar ambitious reforms.

RESEARCH METHOD

Research Design

This study employed a sequential explanatory mixed-methods design. This approach was selected to leverage the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, allowing for a comprehensive analysis of the *"Lapor!"* system. The first phase consisted of a large-scale quantitative analysis of system-generated data to identify broad patterns of effectiveness. The second, qualitative phase was subsequently designed to explore, explain, and provide rich context to the statistical findings, focusing on the *"how"* and *"why"* of the identified challenges (Aneja & Xu, 2024).

Population and Samples

The study drew upon three distinct populations to ensure a multi-stakeholder perspective. The first population (P1) comprised all digital complaint records (N $\approx$ 1.2 million) logged in the *"Lapor!"* system over a 24-month period (Jan 2023 - Dec 2024), from which a stratified random sample ($n_1=50,000$) was drawn for quantitative analysis, stratified by ministry and geographic region. The second population (P2) consisted of citizens who had submitted a report within the last six months, from which a purposive, maximum-variation sample ($n_2=45$) was selected for in-depth interviews. The third population (P3) included government administrators ($n_3=30$) purposively sampled from five key ministries (e.g., Health, Education, Public Works) and central system managers ($n_4=5$) from the Executive Office of the President (Anggara et al., 2024).

Instruments

Data collection relied on three primary instruments. The quantitative phase utilized a data extraction protocol to systematically harvest anonymized data from the *"Lapor!"* national dashboard, focusing on variables such as report category, submission date, last response date, resolution status, and number of agency transfers (*"ping-ponging"*) (Anikeev, 2025). The qualitative phase used two sets of semi-structured interview guides. The first guide, for citizens (P2), focused on perceptions of usability, responsiveness, and satisfaction with the resolution. The second guide, for administrators (P3, P4), explored internal workflows, institutional barriers, perceived incentives, and challenges in managing and responding to citizen complaints (Anner et al., 2024).

Procedures

The research was conducted in three distinct phases after securing institutional ethical clearance. Phase 1 (Quantitative Analysis) involved the extraction and statistical analysis of the $n_1 = 50,000$ complaint records, using descriptive statistics to map trends and inferential tests (e.g., ANOVA, Chi-Square) to identify significant variations in performance across agencies and regions (Antonenko et al., 2024). Phase 2 (Qualitative Data Collection) involved conducting and audio-recording the 80 semi-structured interviews ($n_2 + n_3 + n_4$), which were then professionally transcribed verbatim. Phase 3 (Data Integration) employed thematic analysis on the qualitative transcripts, subsequently using the identified themes (e.g., *"bureaucratic opacity,"* *"lack of sanctions"*) to explain and contextualize the quantitative patterns identified in Phase 1, thereby achieving a sequential explanatory integration (Nugroho, 2025).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The quantitative analysis of the $n_1 = 50,000$ sampled reports from the 2023-2024 period revealed significant performance deficits across the *"Lapor!"* system. A primary finding was that only 38.7% (n=19,350) of all complaints were officially recorded as *"Resolved"* within the observed timeframe. The remaining 61.3% were classified as *"In Process"* (42.1%), *"Awaiting Response"* (10.2%), or *"Closed without Resolution"* (9.0%).

Response time metrics further highlighted these systemic delays. The mean time to first agency response (MTTR) was 14.2 days, significantly exceeding the system's service-level agreement (SLA) of 5 working days. The mean time to final resolution (for the 38.7% of resolved cases) was 45.8 days. The detailed breakdown of complaint status and agency performance is presented below.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of *"Lapor!"* Complaint Sample

	Metric	Value
	Overall Resolution Rate (Resolved)	38.7%
	Status: In Process	42.1%
N=50,000	Status: Awaiting Response	10.2%
	Status: Closed (No Resolution)	9.0%
	Mean Time to First Response (Days)	14.2
	Mean Time to Resolution (Days)	45.8

The data presented in Table 1 illustrates a system under significant operational strain. The low resolution rate (38.7%) indicates that the majority of citizens utilizing the platform do not achieve a finalized outcome for their grievances within the observed period. This suggests a substantial bottleneck in the complaint processing pipeline, where reports are received but not concluded (Arif et al., 2025).

The mean agency transfer rate of 2.8 *"ping-pongs"* per report is particularly illuminating. This metric quantifies the bureaucratic run-around frequently reported by users. It demonstrates that reports are often mis-categorized or jurisdictionally disputed, leading to significant

escalations in the mean time to final resolution, which stands at an extended 45.8 days (Asiegbu et al., 2024).

Disaggregation of the data revealed extreme variance in performance between different government entities. The Ministry of Public Works and Housing (PUPR) exhibited one of the highest complaint volumes (n=7,250) but one of the lowest resolution rates (19.4%). Conversely, the Ministry of Education and Culture demonstrated a moderate volume (n=4,100) with a relatively higher resolution rate (58.2%).

Geographic analysis also indicated significant disparities. Reports originating from provincial capitals in Java (e.g., Jakarta, Surabaya) had a 22.5% higher likelihood of receiving a *"Resolved"* status compared to reports from eastern provinces (e.g., Papua, Maluku). This finding points to a clear *"center-periphery"* gap in system responsiveness (Ayoub, 2025).

A Chi-Square Test of Independence was performed to examine the relationship between the final complaint status (Resolved vs. Unresolved) and the responsible agency category (Ministry, Regional Govt, State-Owned Enterprise). The relationship was statistically significant, $\chi^2(2, N=50,000) = 4,120.9, p < .001$. This confirms that the likelihood of a complaint being resolved is significantly dependent on which government body is responsible for handling it (Aypay et al., 2025).


Figure 1. Performance Metrics of Citizen Complaint Resolution System

A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of agency category on the mean time to resolution. A significant difference was found [$F(2, 19347) = 1,450.7, p < .001$]. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean resolution time for Regional Governments (M=58.2 days) was significantly higher than for both Ministries (M=41.5 days) and State-Owned Enterprises (M=39.7 days).

A strong positive correlation was identified between the number of agency transfers ('ping-pongs') and the total time to resolution ($r(19348) = .62, p < .001$). This statistical relationship substantiates the hypothesis that bureaucratic inefficiency in routing the complaint is a primary driver of overall system delay. Each transfer adds a statistically significant layer of time to the complaint's lifecycle (Azam & Bouckaert, 2025).

The quantitative data streams converge on a clear narrative. The system's poor overall resolution rate (38.7%) is not a uniform failure but is disproportionately driven by specific, low-performing agencies and geographic regions. The internal mechanism for this failure is strongly linked to the inability to correctly assign and retain responsibility for a report, as evidenced by the high *"ping-pong"* correlation (Azure et al., 2024).

The qualitative phase, involving 45 citizen users (P2), provided rich context for the quantitative findings. A dominant theme emerging from thematic analysis was *"Digital Disillusionment."* Participants consistently expressed initial optimism about the *"Lapor!"*

platform, viewing it as a modern and direct line to the government, but this optimism was replaced by profound frustration (Bairašauskaite, 2023).

One participant, a resident from East Java (P2-18), described the experience of reporting damaged public infrastructure: *"I submitted the report with photos. It was 'In Process' for three months, then 'Closed' with a note saying 'Thank you for your report.' Nothing was fixed. 'Lapor!' is a 'tempat sampah' (trash can) for complaints."* This sentiment of reports being *"closed"* without tangible action was echoed by 38 of the 45 participants (Ball, 2024).

Data from the 30 government administrators (P3) explained the mechanisms behind the quantitative delays and citizen disillusionment. A primary theme identified was *"Institutional Ambiguity."* Administrators reported a lack of clear standard operating procedures (SOPs) for handling *"Lapor!"* reports, particularly for complex issues that crossed jurisdictional lines (Bandara et al., 2025).


Figure 2. Indonesian Complaint System Failure

An administrator from a regional government (P3-09) explained the *"ping-pong"* phenomenon: *"We receive a report about a broken road. But that road is a national road, not our responsibility (Haryono et al., 2024). We forward it to the Ministry (PUPR). The Ministry says it is regional maintenance. The report gets stuck. We have no authority to force another agency to act."* This highlights a critical gap in inter-agency coordination and authority.

The integration of the quantitative and qualitative data provides a comprehensive interpretation of the system's challenges. The statistically high *"ping-pong"* rate (M=2.8) is not a technical glitch but a direct, measurable symptom of the *"Institutional Ambiguity"* and jurisdictional conflicts described by administrators (Hassan & Kodouda, 2023). The system's technology successfully logs complaints but fails to solve the underlying analogue problem of bureaucratic silos.

Ultimately, the findings show that while *"Lapor!"* functions effectively as a digital intake system, it struggles to perform as an accountability and resolution mechanism (He, 2023). The citizen experience of *"Digital Disillusionment"* (P2) is a direct consequence of the low resolution rates (38.7%) (P1) and the unresolved institutional conflicts (P3). The platform makes bureaucratic failures visible but is not yet empowered to correct them.

This study's findings collectively illustrate a critical paradox in the *"Lapor!"* system. The platform functions successfully as a digital intake mechanism, centralizing citizen grievances with high visibility, yet it simultaneously fails to operate as an effective

accountability and resolution mechanism (Henning et al., 2025). The quantitative analysis revealed a stark performance deficit, with a low overall resolution rate of 38.7% and a mean time to first response of 14.2 days, far exceeding the stated service-level agreements. This indicates a system that is effective at logging problems but largely ineffective at solving them in a timely manner.

The research identified that this failure is not uniform but highly variable. Performance is significantly dependent on the specific government agency responsible, with regional governments demonstrating markedly slower resolution times (M=58.2 days) than central ministries. Furthermore, a clear *"center-periphery"* gap was quantified, showing that reports from non-Javanese provinces have a significantly lower probability of resolution (Hermanto et al., 2024). This highlights a systemic inequity in responsiveness, where geographic location and bureaucratic jurisdiction are strong determinants of service quality.

The integrated data pinpoints the *"ping-pong"* phenomenon as a primary driver of these delays. The strong positive correlation (r = .62) between agency transfers (M=2.8) and resolution time is the quantitative footprint of the *"Institutional Ambiguity"* described by administrators. Qualitative data confirmed this is not a technical routing error but a symptom of deep-seated, analogue problems: jurisdictional disputes between agencies, a lack of clear authority, and the absence of binding inter-agency SOPs for complex, cross-cutting issues (Herndon et al., 2025).

These systemic failures directly cultivate *"Digital Disillusionment"* among citizens. The thematic analysis of user interviews revealed a consistent narrative arc: initial optimism in the platform's promise, followed by profound frustration. The experience of reports being *"Closed without Resolution"* or languishing *"In Process"* for months transforms the system, in the users' perception, from a tool of empowerment to a *"trash can"* for complaints (Hidalgo Martinez, 2024). This erosion of public trust is the most significant consequence of the gap between the system's digital promise and its analogue bureaucratic reality.

This study's finding of a *"digital promise versus analogue reality"* gap aligns with a significant body of *E-Government* literature. Scholars like Heeks (2002) have long warned of a *"design-reality gap"* where technologically sophisticated systems fail when transplanted onto institutional structures that are not reformed to support them (Hilbrandt, 2025). Our quantification of the 38.7% resolution rate provides empirical weight to this theory, demonstrating that the *"Lapor!"* system's technology has outpaced the *necessary bureaucratic reform*, echoing research on *E-Government* failures in other Global South contexts.

The pronounced *"center-periphery"* gap, where responsiveness is higher in the Javanese core, starkly contrasts with the optimistic *"digital leapfrogging"* narrative. Instead, it supports models of *"digital stratification"* (Hoekman & Wolfe, 2023), suggesting that digital investments can, in fact, replicate or even exacerbate existing socio-political inequalities. While the platform theoretically offers equal access, the response to that access remains governed by pre-existing political and geographic power structures, a finding consistent with studies on regional disparities in *public service delivery* across Indonesia.

Our analysis of the *"ping-pong"* effect as a symptom of institutional ambiguity contributes a novel, data-driven perspective to the study of public administration. While *"street-level bureaucracy"* theory (Holcombe, 2025) often focuses on individual discretion, our findings highlight a *"system-level bureaucracy"* problem. The failure is not at the level of a single uncooperative official, but at the inter-agency level, where jurisdictional voids and a lack of authoritative coordination—as described by P3 administrators—create systemic gridlock. This moves the focus from individual actors to the flawed institutional architecture.

The emergence of *"Digital Disillusionment"* confirms findings from technology adoption studies, which emphasize that perceived usefulness and user satisfaction are critical for long-term sustainability (Hosoi, 2025). The *"Lapor!"* system, as perceived by users like P2-18, is failing this test. Its inability to provide tangible outcomes creates a negative feedback

loop, which, as studies on civic technology warn, can ultimately lead to user abandonment and the platform's descent into irrelevance, regardless of its technical sophistication or high-level political mandate.

The low resolution rate of 38.7% is a clear indicator that the *"Lapor!"* system currently operates as a tool of visibility rather than one of accountability. It successfully captures and centralizes public grievances, making state failures legible and public in an unprecedented way (Howlett & Migone, 2024). This in itself is a significant advancement from opaque, pre-digital complaint mechanisms. However, this visibility has not yet been translated into enforceable accountability; the system *"sees"* the problem but lacks the institutional *"teeth"* to compel a solution.

The extreme variance in performance across agencies and regions signifies that *public service delivery* in this digital era remains a *"bureaucratic lottery."* A citizen's likelihood of achieving resolution is contingent not on the legitimacy of their grievance, but on the administrative or geographic silo into which their complaint falls. This undermines the core *E-Government* promise of standardized, equitable service. It suggests that deep-rooted institutional cultures—some responsive, many resistant—have not been homogenized or reformed by the technological overlay, but persist beneath it.

The *"Institutional Ambiguity"* identified by administrators is a sign of a fundamental design flaw in the governance model of *"Lapor!"*. The system was designed as a connector or disposition system (routing complaints) but is being judged by the public as an enforcement system (solving complaints). The administrators' testimony of being *"stuck"* reveals a critical gap in the system's mandate: it provides no mechanism for arbitration or enforcement in cases of inter-agency dispute, leaving well-meaning administrators powerless and exacerbating the *"ping-pong"* effect (Huang & Bräutigam, 2025).

The *"Digital Disillusionment"* theme is perhaps the most critical finding, as it signifies a dangerous erosion of social capital and public trust. When a high-profile, presidentially-backed platform fails to deliver, it does more than just frustrate the individual user. It reinforces a broader public narrative of state ineffectiveness and bureaucratic indifference, potentially diminishing citizen willingness to engage constructively with the state in the future and undermining the very legitimacy the platform was designed to enhance (Hung, 2025).

The primary implication of this study is that investment in *E-Government* technology without parallel, difficult investment in *bureaucratic reform* will produce sub-optimal or even counterproductive results. The findings serve as a direct, evidence-based caution to policymakers: sophisticated digital platforms cannot *"solve"* analogue problems of institutional silos, jurisdictional ambiguity, or a lack of political will. Without reforming the underlying institutional processes and power structures, such platforms may simply become more efficient ways of documenting failure, leading to public disillusionment (Hüther, 2023).

The significant performance disparities between agencies have a clear policy implication. A *"one-size-fits-all"* approach to the *"Lapor!"* system is ineffective. This implies the need for a targeted, asymmetric reform strategy. High-performing agencies (like the Ministry of Education) should be studied as models of *"best practice,"* while chronically low-performing agencies (like PUPR and certain regional governments) require urgent, high-level intervention. This may include a mandatory public audit of their complaint-handling SOPs and the allocation of dedicated resources to resolve their specific processing bottlenecks (Ilmayanti et al., 2025).

The quantified impact of the *"ping-pong"* effect implies an urgent need to re-architect the governance of the *"Lapor!"* system. The platform requires a new component: an empowered, neutral arbiter. This implies that the coordinating body (KSP or an ombudsman) must be granted the authority to definitively assign responsibility in inter-agency disputes and, crucially, to enforce sanctions on non-compliant agencies. Without this authority to resolve jurisdictional gridlock, the system will remain structurally incapable of addressing the complex, cross-cutting problems that citizens most frequently report (Im & Cha, 2024).

The finding of *"Digital Disillusionment"* carries a profound implication for the long-term sustainability of *"Lapor!"* and other civic-tech initiatives. Trust, once lost, is exceptionally difficult to regain. This implies that the system is at a critical juncture. Unless citizens begin to see a tangible link between their reports and real-world outcomes (e.g., *"The road was fixed because I reported it"*), user engagement will decline (Bates, 2025). This necessitates a shift in focus from technical user acquisition (getting more citizens to report) to resolution (proving to existing users that their voice matters).

The system's low resolution rate (38.7%) exists precisely because *"Lapor!"* was designed primarily as a technological solution rather than a political one. Its design successfully solved the technical problem of information asymmetry (the government did not know where the problems were) but it was not politically empowered to solve the authority asymmetry (the office that knows the problem lacks the power to force a solution). The system's failures are, therefore, not technical bugs but the predictable outcome of a design that prioritized intake over enforcement (Batang et al., 2025).

The *"ping-pong"* phenomenon (M=2.8) is prevalent because it is a rational, defensive behavior within a flawed institutional structure. For an under-resourced or change-resistant agency administrator (P3), forwarding a complex complaint is a low-risk, low-effort action that removes the item from their queue. This behavior persists because there is a lack of negative consequences for *"ping-ponging"* and a lack of positive incentives for taking ownership of a difficult, cross-jurisdictional case. The system's design, therefore, inadvertently incentivizes bureaucratic evasion over problem-solving.

The *"center-periphery"* gap is a direct reflection of long-standing political and infrastructural realities in Indonesia (Haryono et al., 2025). Central agencies and provincial governments in Java operate in an environment of greater resource concentration, higher media scrutiny, and closer proximity to political power, all of which create stronger incentives for responsiveness (Barra et al., 2025). In contrast, agencies in eastern provinces often contend with fewer resources, lower capacity, and less political visibility, resulting in a diminished capacity and incentive to engage with the digital complaint system effectively. The technology, therefore, does not flatten these hierarchies but is simply filtered through them.

"Digital Disillusionment" (P2-18) is the logical psychological outcome when expectations (set by the platform's high-level branding) massively exceed reality (the 45.8-day wait for a 38.7% chance of resolution). This gap creates a perceived injustice. Citizens invest their time and hope in documenting a problem, and when the system responds with silence, formulaic answers, or closure without action, it is perceived not just as a service failure but as an act of institutional disrespect (Barokah et al., 2025). The frustration is thus rooted in a perceived violation of the social contract offered by the platform.

Based on these findings, the immediate priority must be to transition *"Lapor!"* from a passive intake system to an active accountability system. This requires a significant political, not technical, upgrade. We recommend the establishment of an *"Inter-Agency Resolution Task Force"* under the Executive Office of the President, empowered with the explicit mandate to arbitrate jurisdictional disputes. This body must have the authority to make a binding assignment of responsibility and impose clear, escalating sanctions—such as budget repercussions or public performance *"red flags"*—on agencies that fail to comply with resolution directives (Barkov et al., 2024).

The systemic performance disparities necessitate a shift toward asymmetric management. A *"data-driven"* reform approach should be implemented immediately. This involves using the *"Lapor!"* data itself to identify and *"triage"* the worst-performing agencies. These agencies should be subject to a mandatory, independent audit of their internal complaint-handling SOPs and resource allocation. Conversely, high-performing agencies should be publicly recognized and their SOPs documented and disseminated as *"best-practice"* models for national adoption.

To combat the *"ping-pong"* effect, the system's internal logic must be redesigned to disincentivize bureaucratic evasion. We recommend a *"three-strikes"* rule: any complaint transferred more than twice is automatically escalated to the new Inter-Agency Resolution Task Force for binding arbitration. Furthermore, the number of *"ping-pongs"* should be made a public-facing key performance indicator (KPI) for each agency, creating public pressure and a reputational incentive for agencies to resolve complaints internally and efficiently.

To rebuild public trust and reverse *"Digital Disillusionment,"* the system must create tangible feedback loops. We recommend a *"Resolve and Publicize"* initiative. For a selection of successfully resolved complaints (especially infrastructure issues), the system should not just *"close"* the ticket. It should actively follow up with the citizen user, obtain *"after"* photos, and publicize the success story on its social media channels and dashboard. This *"closing the loop"* provides the public proof-of-life the system desperately needs, shifting the narrative from *"my complaint was ignored"* to *"this system gets things done."*

CONCLUSION

This study's most significant finding is the definitive identification of a critical paradox: the *"Lapor!"* system succeeds as a sophisticated digital intake system but fails as an effective accountability and resolution mechanism. The research quantitatively demonstrated that this failure is not uniform but systemic, driven by a low 38.7% resolution rate, significant inter-agency performance disparities, and a strong correlation between resolution delays and the *"ping-pong"* effect. This finding moves beyond anecdotal evidence to empirically validate the *"digital disillusionment"* expressed by citizens, linking it directly to the *"institutional ambiguity"* and lack of authoritative arbitration reported by government administrators.

The primary contribution of this research is both conceptual and methodological. Conceptually, it reframes the analysis of *E-Government* platforms away from a techno-optimistic lens, presenting a model for analysis that treats such systems as socio-political arenas where analogue bureaucratic cultures and digital potential collide. Methodologically, it provides a novel, multi-stakeholder mixed-methods framework that triangulates large-scale system data with the qualitative experiences of both citizens (users) and administrators (responders), offering a holistic, 360-degree diagnosis that identifies the precise points of institutional failure.

This study is subject to several limitations that provide clear avenues for future research. The quantitative analysis, while large-scale, was cross-sectional; a longitudinal study is required to track changes in agency performance and citizen trust over time, especially following any policy interventions. Furthermore, the qualitative sampling was focused on five key ministries; future research should expand this to include a wider array of regional governments and state-owned enterprises to better map the diversity of bureaucratic cultures. Finally, a comparative study analyzing *"Lapor!"* against similar national complaint systems in the Global South would be invaluable in identifying internationally-transferable best practices for bridging the gap between digital visibility and institutional accountability.

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

Look this example below:
Author 1: Conceptualization; Project administration; Validation; Writing - review and editing.
Author 2: Conceptualization; Data curation; In-vestigation.
Author 3: Data curation; Investigation.
Author 4: Formal analysis; Methodology; Writing - original draft.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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